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THE WAY FORWARD?: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY REFORM IN MALAYSIA 
The dominant ideas in development economics have changed 
considerably over the four decades of its existence. Similarly, 
the influence of theory on policymaking has also changed, not 
only with new ideas, but more impo11Bntly, with the Ideological 
preferences of those with power and influence, especially at 
the national and International levels. 
During the eighties, development economics - which has 
emphasized market failures· and other welfare reasons for 
Judicious state Intervention to ensure greater equity and 
efficiency - was under selge from the Intellectual assault of 
market neo-conservatlves In control of the major International 
economic institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, and supported by the dominant ideologies of 
Thatcherism and Reaganomics at the global level. Political 
economy, rejected in the seventies as an unsophisticated 
nineteenth century approach of the political Left, re-emerged 
in ttie hands of the Right as the main weapon in this assault. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and allied East European 
regimes and the marketaatlon of the remaining economies still 
claiming to be in the· socialist camp only seemed to prove the 
worst claims of the generally politically conservative economic 
liberals of the late twentieth century. 
By the early nineties, however, the pendulum seems 
poised for a return to the centre. Reagan was replaced by 
Bush, who was In turn defeated by Clinton with his ambiguous 
commitment to revive the US economy through selective state 
Interventions. Thatcher was succoodod by Major, who Is In 
dangor of going tho way of Bu h for hi h ndlln of tho 
economy. Reflecting Its now found lnfluonco lntornatlonally, 
the Jap noso Govornmont fundod a ma slvo World Bonk 
study of the so-called Asian mlraclo oconomlo to omph slzo 
the crucial role of tho state In lato lndustrlallzatlon and rapid 










world seem to be In trouble due to. abuses of power and the 
role of the state in the allocation and appropriation of economic 
rents, broadly understood as extra Incomes attributable to 
market 'imperfections' of various types. 
All this, if nothing else, Invites critical review of economic 
theory and policy orthodoxies, both old and new. The eighties' 
assault on development economics has left it In a state of 
malaise, from which It does not seem about to recover. 
However, for much of the world, developing or otherwise, these 
issues are not merely questions of academic Interest. 
Countless lives actually depend on them. 
Malaysia, however, Is more fortunate In that these Issues 
are not quite matters of life and death, except perhaps for 
some politicians. But considering the fragility of the nation, 
and arguably, much of the economy, there Is a great deal at 
stake. And as with so much else, we cannot afford to gamble. 
The following critical review of the political economy of 
development policy reform in Malaysia straddles the interface 
between economic development theory and Malaysian 
experience to suggest how one might inform analysis of the 
other, In order to identify lessons and challenges for Malaysia's 
way forward. 
Since the late colonial period in the fifties, and especially 
during the seventies, the Malaysian state has been 
Interventionist on a broad range of fronts. To ensure regime 
stability, resources have been allocated to support the broad- 
based 'consociational' ruling coalition of interests primarily 
organized along ethnic lines. Thus, It can be said that the 
multi-ethnic ruling coalition has been supported by a set of 
differential entitlements which It has appropriated and 
determined for Itself. The first such set, negotiated among the 
ethnic polltloal elites In the rnld-tlttlss on the ave of 
lndependenoo In 1967, subsoquontly proved to bo 
unacceptable to both the Malay and non-Malay masses In 
Peninsular Malaysia, rosultlng In tho oloctoral rojectlon of the 
ruling Alliance In the May 1969 gonor I oloctlon. 
A gerrymandered polltloal system and Emorgoncy powers 
ensured the retention of Alllanoo rulo undor n w lo dorshlp, 









of 'national unity', defined primarily in inter-ethnic terms), or 
set of entitlements, usually referred to as the New Economic 
Policy (NEP). The NEP had, as its cornerstone, an official 
redistributive commitment to poverty reduction and inter-ethnic 
near-parity in wealth and modern sector employment, i.e. to 
bring the politically hegemonic Malays on par with the 
apparently economically dominant Chinese. This was 
complemented by new official legitimation efforts in the form 
of a national ideology (the Rukunegara) and the broadened 
Barisan Nasional ruling coalition in which UMNO's supremacy 
was enhanced. 
Soon after Mahathlr Mohamad became Malaysia's fourth 
prime minister In mid· 1981, he introduced his own statlst 
development agenda, emphasizing East Asian style 
modernization and heavy industrialization. By the mid-eighties, 
however, brewing fiscal and debt problems, exacerbated by 
recession due to decllnlng private Investments, primary 
commodity price collapses and deflationary policies at both 
international and national levels, precipitated Malaysia's 
deepest economic and, arguably, political crisis since the 
sixties. These crises either pushed or helped - depending on 
one's interpretation - Mahathir and his new Finance Minister 
Daim to introduce various liberalizing economic policy reforms, 
then justified as temporary measures to deal with the 
unprecedentedly severe recession of 1985-6. The sustained 
economic boom since then, heavily based on East Asian 
investments in export-led industrialization throughout the region 
since the endaka (yen appreciation), and his political success 
against his opponents have probably encouraged and also 
helped him to consolidate and deepen the new policy direction. 
This Is clear from his February 1991 inaugural speech to the 
Malaysian Business Council - entitled 'The Way Forward' - 
to achieve 'developed country' status by the year 2020 as well 
as subsequent documents including the Privatisatioh 
Masterplan, the Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-2000, 
and the Sixth Malaysia Plan, 1991-1995. Vision 2020 
Incorporates all the uncontroversial desiderata of the NEP and 
the Rukunegara, while adding a couple more - a caring 










times. However, it's main appeal lies In Its espousal of rapid 
growth, modernization and industrialization, in an apparent 
reversal of the single-minded Inter-ethnic redistributive 
emphasis of the NEP. The study of political economy helps 
us to critically understand the development making policy 
process, particularly the complex dialectics of efficiency and 
equity, private and public domains, the market and the state. 
CLASS 
States seem to enjoy varying degrees of autonomy from 
the dominant class, which would preclude a· simple 
Instrumentalist view of the state (Millband 1969; Hua 1983). 
This does not mean, however, that societal forces, Including 
class and class fractional Interests, have not Influenced and 
constrained the state. In the absence of a strong bourgeoisie, 
or capitalist class, many post-colonial states have been led by 
Kaleckian 'intermediate regimes', dominated by petty 
bourgeoisies - or middle classes -of white collar 
professionals and small businessmen inclined to be populist, 
nationalist and hostile to foreign capital. In Malaysia, the post- 
colonial dominance of the state by the Malay petty bourgeoisie 
has also involved a hostility to the ubiquitous and generally 
ascendant Chinese Malaysian capital. 
The role of the educated petty bourgeoisie in leading the 
populist, nationalist masses in most struggles for national 
independence ensured their pre-eminence in post-colonial 
intermediate regimes. The limited educational opportunities 
under colonialism further ensured the capture of the state 
apparatus after Independence by the educated petty 
bourgeoisie because of tho dearth of 'quallflod' personnel. One 
does not have to view them a the van uard of a petty 
bourgoolslo aspiring to bocomo a st t bour olslo, or ovon 
as the Instrument of an ascendant nascent bourgeoisie. 
Loading olomonts amon morn may woll h vo boon lnfluonced 
by Wostorn social domocratlc and oconornlo natlonall t 
ldeologlos, and m y also have boon dlsdalnful or suspicious of 
their own bu lnosa communltlo nd forol n lnvo tmont for 










In Malaysia, ethnic political mobilization exacerbated 
economic and cultural suspicions to fuel such sentiments 
among the dominant Malay petty bourgeoisie which inherited 
the state machinery and gained political ascendance in the 
ethnically gerrymandered political system that emerged with 
Independence. Furthermore, for many who desired the 
emergence of a 'Bumiputera commercial and Industrial 
community' with the NEP, public sector expansion was to be 
a temporary phenomenon until private Malay accumulation 
could take over. 
Nevertheless, with the accumulation of considerable assets 
in the public sector, supported by politicians, managers and 
other interested parties, It was generally assumed that such 
resources would be retained for disposal by the Malay- 
dominated state. Hence, It has been argued, the state sector 
was considered 'safe' as tong as economic performance was 
acceptable since there were no serious class or other systemic 
elements threatening It And in so far as the public sector was 
considered self-perpetuating, there has been concern for 
sustainability, which is not however tantamount to a strategy 
for class self-preservation. 
It can be argued that the presumption of the existence of 
a state bourgeoisie is problematic because there Is little 
evidence of a strategy for class reproduction and defence of 
class interests. Instead, so-called state bourgeoisies are 
characterized by mobility since their wealth and power are not 
personally owned and therefore not inter-generationally trans- 
ferable. But class privileges derived from political power or 
influence can certainly be retained and enlarged by 
appropriating percuniary benefits and other advantages 
through official means of resource allocation. However, in so 
far as members of the state bourgeoisie cannot really retain 
their privileges inter-generationally, they do not seek to 
reproduce themselves as a class. 
This Is different from personally retaining class privileges 
for the duration of one's tenure, which may ensure inertia and 
thus, the long term preservation of privilege. Hence, while 
seeking to preserve personal privilege - which may also 










bourgeoisie Is generally also committed to capturing resources 
which may be deployed for the Inter-generational transfer of 
privilege and advantage, e.g. scholarships for children and 
other family members to privately appropriate resources for the 
personal accumulation of 'human capital'. 
The ruling petty bourgeoisie tends to use the state and 
public enterprise to promote its own (class) Interests, including 
personal wealth accumulation, thus qualifying as a statist - 
rather than state - bourgeoisie (Jomo 1986). In this view 
then, there is no real antagonism between the public and 
private sectors. Thus, since the state is also committed to 
create conditions suitable for Indigenous private capital 
accumulation, its subsequent disengagement from direct 
Intervention, with the diminution of the public enterprise sector, 
may be desired for the further development of the politically 
dominant Indigenous petty bourgeoisie, rather than be 
perceived as Inimical to Its interests. 
Hence, the recent international pressures for and trend 
towards privatization, encouraged by various multilateral lnsti· 
tutions, may actually serve as a windfall, accelerating a 
process desired by such petty bourgeoisies desiring to 
transform themselves into bourgeoisies, albeit of a rentier, 
rather than of an entrepreneurial type. Thus, while a state 
bourgeoisie - which identifies its interests entirely with the fate 
of the public sector - may be threatened by changes under- 
mining state power and prerogatives, a statist bourgeoisie or 
petty bourgeoisie, who uses the state for ultimately private 
wealth accumulation, is quite capable of using state policy 
changes, Including privatization, to Its own advantage. 
It has been suggested that this process of economic 
llberallzatlon has beon sustained by tho failure of state 
Intervention - rather than by evolving class lnterosts - since 
the petty bourgeolslo does not ro lly nood publlc onterprlso 
to further Its lntorosts and tho st to Is not moro f r-slghted than 
the private actors In whoso namo It rules. Howover, this 
suggestion Is flawod as such ol lrvoy nco no d not bo 
ascribed to the state for a class perspective to bo valld. he 
suggestion also contradicts many of tho cl ss-ln plr d crltlquos 










the often counter-productive nature of state interventions for 
private accumulation. There are states and there are states. 
Just because some states cannot or fail to develop real private 
sectors does not mean that all states are institutionally 
incapable of doing so. 
Undoubtedly, the problems of state intervention, particularly 
for personal accumulation by the ambitious ruling petty 
bourgeoisie, have been very considerable. This has encourage 
the shift favouring more private accumulation. However, the 
earlier reliance on state intervention can be seen in the context 
of the need for state legitimation of, and resource mobilization 
for accelerated capital accumulation, best achieved through 
public sector expansion. Consequently, the blatant private 
appropriation of public assets and state resources would 
delegitimlze the Intermediate regime and Its popullst, nationalist 
pretensions, reducing It to a predatory state. Hence, mimicry 
of market mechanisms. e.g. privatization, and subsequent 
asset exchange and transformation become Important options 
for legitimizing and protecting the conversion of public Into 
private wealth. The development of such mechanisms may, 
in certain circumstances, actually serve to reduce some kinds 
of rent~seeking or corruption, but does not alter the fact of rent 
appropriation or capture by the politically influential. 
In theory, for example, contracting out government services 
is supposed to inject all the virtues of the market - 
competition, innovation and flexibility - into the public domain, 
but in practice, when too many public services are contracted 
out, there are just not enough public officials and just too l!ttle 
sense of public service to ensure accountability, efficiency and 
honesty In a system dominated by providers, and not the 
cttlzens whose Interests have been invoked. Thus, 
government by contract combines the inefficiencies of the 
public sector with the worse aspects of the private sector. 
THE STATE 
State Intervention has been reflected in various plans, 
regulatory efforts, tarrtts and other trade restrictions, substantial 










or bypass private - foreign and especially Chinese Malaysian 
- enterprise. However, many of these efforts have actually 
been contradictory and even counter-productive, reflecting their 
different motives and multiple objectives, as well as personal 
interests, poor conceptualization and implementation. 
Nevertheless, the political organization and administrative 
competence of a government have been suggested as the 
decidedly most important explanatory variables of differing 
economic performance over the last two centuries (Reynolds 
1986). For the Northeast Asian late industrializing economies 
of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, It has been suggested that 
'embedded autonomy' - in which politicians reign, but 
technocrats rule (Johnson, 1982), where government organs 
are relatively Insulated from societal pressures --- has been 
central. 
Implicit In competing perspectives are different views of the 
state. An old divide has been between those who see the 
state as primarily the instrument of particular social interests 
and those who emphasize that the state is largely autonomous 
of such interests. These approaches have different 
implications for the presumed logic of state actions, with 
implications for the role, determinants, nature, scope, degree 
and beneficiaries of state intervention. 
The now much criticized benevolent perspective of the 
state - implicit in much thinking supportive of planning, public 
enterprise and other state intervention - is that the state is 
peopled by altruistic, competent and far-sighted individuals who 
would mobilize and deploy scarce economic resources as well 
as conceptualize and Implement policies to achieve sustained 
growth and general welfare Improvements. 
One crucial problem, of courso, Is the assumption of the 
continued exlstonco of selnoss, nltrulstc, dovot d and onll ht· 
onod publlo offlclal who roslst opportunlllos to abuse the 
powers derived from tholr control ovor st to lntorventlon and 
tho puollo sector. Another problom ha boon tho In blllty to 
efflclenUy - and equitably - concolve of and lmplomont stra- 
tegies and modos of steto lntorvontlon and publlo sector growth. 
Tho m lovolont (prod tory') vtow - r c ntly popul rlz d 










varieties of the new Institutionalism - regards the state as 
essentially a collection ('mafia') of self·interested individuals 
primarily concerned with extracting rents in the form of 
economic resources. To legitimize such resource extraction 
('plunder', 'looting'), the state is obliged to perpetuate certain 
myths about its raison d'etre and actions. 
The autonomous-malevolent view then argues that the 
cumulative strength of powerful extensive state machineries 
will eventually result in the abuse of the public interest, with 
the state exploiting its powers to extract more resources from 
the disorganized public while rewarding organized interest 
groups - 'distributive coalitions' (Olson 1982) - allied to the 
state's executive leadership. Property rights and entitlements 
are then designed to maximize the power and wealth of 
powerful Individuals and Interest groups, and to reward the 
faithful for their loyalty and support. The predatory view of the 
state and state intervention, almost by definition, implies short· 
termism in natural resource extraction, with Its obvious negative 
implications for resource conservation and ecological balance. 
What then is the relationship between state Intervention 
and economic inefficiency? Directly unproductive profit· 
seeking (DUP) involves pursuing opportunities for profit without 
enhancing the productive forces of the economy. Most 
microeconomic analysis of this phenomenon has focussed on 
the role of the government in creating such opportunities 
through regulation of economic activity, though there Is no 
analytical reason why such analysis of directly unproductive 
profit·seeking cannot be extended to 'distortions' due to 
unequal access to lnfonnation, differential transaction costs or 
even poor operation and regulation of markets such as the 
stock exchange. The dominance of the (unproductive) financial 
sector in the less regulated Anglo·American capitalist systems, 
with its consequent domination over manufacturing, contrasts 
with the subordination of finance to industry in the judiciously 
more regulated Japanese and German economies. SimUarly, 
there Is little reason to presume that deregulation in Malaysia 
would ensure that investible funds would be more attracted to 
Industry or agriculture, rather than finance, real property or 









However, the rentier nature or origins of Income does not 
mean that such Income will necessarily be subsequently 
deployed unproductively. Scale economies or other consid- 
erations may well determine that a perfectively competitive 
situation will be sub-optimal, In which case the question arises 
of how best to distribute or allocate such rents. Rather than 
insist on competition In such circumstances In a vain search 
for efficiency, which would effectively dissipate the rent through 
the expenditure of rent seeking costs, the state could Instead 
allocate such rents In such a manner so as to accelerate and 
direct the capital accumulation process, e.g. In favour of 
Industrialization. Hence, for Instance, 'effective protection 
conditional on export promotion' policies have been used In 
Northeast Asia to push Import-substituting Industries to export 
through the use of conditional Incentives. It Is not the 
existence of rents In themselves which should always be the 
focus of concern, but rather their distribution or allocation and 
deployment for productive purposes. In many circumstances, 
the existence or attraction of rent capture may well be the most 
effective incentive to encourage productive investment or 
economic activity. e.g. technology development. 
Rent-seeking behaviour is therefore a subset of the 
broader analytical concept of directly unproductive profit- 
seeking, involving all types of rents and not merely those due 
to state intervention. Hence, state ownership of natural 
monopolies or natural resources may actually pre-empt, rather 
than encourage rent-seeking behaviour in such instances. 
Nevertheless, most recent analytical attention has focussed on 
rents attr!buted to state intervention, with economic resources 
expended to gain privileges due to public policy, e.g. licences, 
permits, tariffs, discounted credit, eto.. If such bidding Is fully 
competitive, the gains from prlvllo a should be totally off-set 
by bidding exponsoe, with no not g In to tho economy. lntor- 
ventlonlst states are thorefora prosumod to havo a tondency 
to encourage ront-sooklng. Tho bost ontrepronourlal and 
managerial talent, as well as tho oconomlc ro ourcos thoy am 
In a position to moblllze and deploy, may thus be dlvortod from 
directly produotlvo otlvltlo In pur ult of ronts. And attor ront· 










likely to resist efforts to dismantle the regulations creating 
them. 
State agencies tend to pursue their own typically 
expansionist interests, even at the expense of other state 
agencies, with state economic planners mediating among 
various lobbies. Since they tend to be mobile within the state 
machinery and move among different agencies, managers of 
public resources tend to favour current to future spending, 
'front-loaded' over gradually staggered expenditure 
programmes, capital-intensive over labour-intensive projects, 
and short-term planning horizons. 
In most societies, classes or class fractions lack sufficient 
economic and political strength and coherence to completely 
subordinate the state to their own Interests. Hence, states 
generally enjoy considerable autonomy. The concentration of 
powers and discretion In the hands of the political executive 
- at the expense of the bureaucracy, the legislature, the 
judiciary and the constitutlonal monarchs - would enhance 
the significance of this autonomy In operational terms, enabling 
the executive to make bold initiatives without seeking prior 
endorsement or support even within the state, let alone society 
at large. 
However, state autonomy, in itself, is no guarantee of 
economic progress. The principal-agent relationship may be 
structured in such a manner as to effectively undermine, rather 
than enhance public enterprise performance. Public enterprise 
board members are often politicians, political appointees or 
government officers with varying, though generally limited 
knowledge and understanding of the enterprise. While 
nominally representing the owner (the government), they have 
no personal stake in enterprise performance or profitability. 
Many may be Inspired by a sort of bureaucratic imperative to 
demonstrate their powers by trying to show that they can 
exercise control. Enterprise managers may therefore see the 
government's representatives as interfering, or worse. Views 
expressed by the owner's representatives are often perceived 
by others as reflecting political decisions made elsewhere for 
reasons unoonnected to the enterprise. 










Malaysia's rich natural resources, relatively small population 
and revenue base, wastage and plunder of - not by - the 
state has been broadly tolerated by an ethnically fragmented 
population with fundamentally different perceptions of the state. 
Especially since the NEP, much of the Malay population has 
been persuaded to believe that they have received.enough by 
way of official patronage in the form of ethnic privilege to 
secure their political loyalty. Meanwhile, the partially 
disenfranchised non-Malays - In a heavily gerrymandered 
electoral system offering few political rights to and opportunities 
for public dissent - have gained enough from the generally 
rapidly growing economy, while retaining limited civil liberties 
(schooling, language, religion, culture, etc.), as well as the 
options of exit (emigration) and restricted voice (elections, 
media, etc.) to find the situation - Including the state - 
tolerable. 
Many Malaysian politicians and civil servants initially 
responded to the challenges of Independence and the NEP 
with some commitment and selflessness. Over time, however, 
policy inertia and drift as well as self-aggrandizing behaviour 
seems to have set in. But personal predatory behaviour by 
politicians and bureaucrats do not necessarily add up to a 
predatory state, in the sense of feeding off and thus, im- 
poverishing a country, its economic resources and human 
population. However, high levels of resource extraction have 
been achieved by relatively high tax and savings rates (much 
of which due to mandatory savings by employees). Since the 
NEP, increased public expenditure has mainly been achieved 
through deficit financing - primarily with domestic borrowings, 
except In the first half of the eighties (Jomo 1990) - Implying 
that state spending has been financed at the expense of future 
generations. 
PROPERTY REGIMES 
Thero Is llttlo doubt th t In tho Mal yslan context at loost, 
the legal designation of property does matter. But tho key 
question Is not whothor It manors, but rather how much It 










of former government departments and statutory bodies In 
Malaysia - as a consequence of cerporatlzatlon and 
privatization - has In itself slgnificanttY Improved enterprise 
performance. Key enterprise managers are still appointed by 
the state executive even when the government's ownership 
share has declined to a small minority. Answering to share- 
holders, rather than to politicians, does not seem to have had 
a profound effect on management thus far, perhaps because 
such large enterprise managements are largely Insulated from 
small shareholders without government Influence. 
It has been argued that if public enterprises are managed 
like private assets with hard budget constraints and the 
posslblllty of exit In competitive factor markets, there Is then 
no economic advantage In retaining such assets under state 
control. Ceterus par/bus, however, It should also be 
emphasized that there Is also no disadvantage In doing so. 
In so far as public enterprises are generally also set up with 
redistributive goals, the key challenge Is to ensure that this 
distributional commitment does not compromise enterprise 
efficiency. Although this distributional role Is seldom separated 
from its economic role in practice, the fact that It can be 
distinguished in theory raises the possibility of doing this In 
practice. Ona major task of public enterprise reform then 
should be precisely this, I.e. developing operational strategies 
to ensure that public enterprises' distributional objectives do 
not subvert their economic efficiency. 
It has also been argued that the fact of public ownership 
generates its own culture - characterized by inefficiency, 
lethargy and generally poor management - said to be similar 
across otherwise different systems. The logic of the princlpal- 
agent relationship is said to over-ride the significance of 
culture, class and historical specificity. While this may be true 
of public enter-prises, it is unclear why this should not also 
be true of large modem oligopolistic corporations, as Galbraith, 
Baran and Swee'Z>J and others have observed. In other words, 
the principal-agent problem is not unique to public enterprises. 
Why then Is the legal form of the enterprise considered 
significantly more Important as a determinant ln this matter? 










principal-agent problem, but surely, the legal form cannot be 
said to cause or define the problem. If greater accountabllliy 
can be assured through public enterprise reform, it may well 
prove to be a superior solution to the principal-agent problem 
than the mere change of legal form as such, though admittedly, 
eacn legal form generally only allows a limited range of options. 
Admittedly, for example, the consequences of Inefficiency, poor 
management and failure are very different for public and 
private enterprises, with only the latter facing the threat of exit. 
Nevertheless, before accepting the need for change In legal 
form, It first has to be shown why the legal form does not allow 
the substantive reforms recommended to enhance 
accountability and efficiency. 
Property regimes and rights therefore count, at least In so 
far as they raise different expectations, and hence criteria for 
performance evaluation, and owners and managers con- 
sequently have to respond to different incentives. Property 
regimes define the institutional context for transactions, with 
economic agents having varying degrees of confidence in the 
rule of law, i.e. that non-arbitrary rules and norms governing 
such transactions will be observed. While it is presumably the 
state which enforces the rules embodied in the law, property 
regimes must also be sustained by widely accepted and hence 
self-enforcing norms, hi order to minimize the transaction costs 
of monitoring and enforcing contracts. 
Conversely, It can also be argued that property regimes, 
In themselves, do not really matter. Large bureaucracies, both 
public and private, tend to encourage the blurring and 
duplication of tasks and responsibllitles besides encouraging 
expenditure. In both situations, nolthor taxpayer nor small 
shareholder enjoy effective control, whllo managements c n 
and do admlnlstor self·servlngly and lnofllclontly. Individuals, 
reluctant to contrlbuto to the costs of monitoring, hope to free· 
ride the oollectlvo benefits of monitoring by olhors, rosultln · 
In no monitoring at all. 
It should also be amphasl od that oconomlo thoory doos 
not suggost that prlv toly owned assote wlll perform boner than 
state-owned assets In all clrcum tancos, A thor, fflcloncy Is 









Some public assets may even be more efficiently run than 
private assets if the government enjoys information advantages ' 
about its public enterprises which would not be ensured 
through mere regulation of private enterprise. 
However, recognizing Information as a strategic resource, 
managers and bureaucrats may well withhold information to 
retain greater power, releasing it only to gain strategic 
advantages. They may also defraud the government in various 
ways. Hence, the theoretical information and regulatory 
advantages between the state and its agents may not be of 
practical significance. 
The significance of the property regime In relation to the 
principal-agent problem seems to have been underscored by 
the apparent desire for privatization without changes In 
management by public enterprise managers themselves, 
Implying that the same managers can run their firms more 
efficiently simply by virtue of private ownership. But this desire 
could well simply arise from the perceived opportunities for 
greater rent capture through privatization by management buy- 
out (MBO). In Malaysia, for instance, MBOs have Involved 
heavily discounted asset prices to the politically well connected, 
as in the case of Fima and Peremba just before the 1990 
general election (Gomez 1993). Also, this view Implies that 
there are only two simple stark choices, with ownership crucial, 
whereas there are, in reality, broad spectrums of choice 
involving different permutations of public and private 
ownership, control and regulation. In Malaysia, for Instance, 
trade unions In statutory bodies have long advocated greater 
autonomy and accountablllty for their managements (see 
Mustapha Johan and Shamsulbahriah, 1986). 
Not all state intervention In markets is, by definition, 
distorting, and not all distortion is necessarily undesirable in 
terms of either or both efficiency and equity. Theoretically, 
there Is no reason for public property to be managed 
Inefficiently either. Yet, however, the fact that most public 
assets are managed Inefficiently, and that many interventions 
by the state cause unintended or undesired consequences has 
to be dealt with, even though these may be avoidable in 









constraints, poor accountability, lack of competition and 'no 
exit' are believed to be common to most public enterprises, 
and desperately need to be addressed, especially by those not 
ideologically or dogmatically committed to abolishing all state 
Intervention and public enterprises. The alternative Is the 
recently popular conservative market economic agenda 
reflected in most economic liberalization, structural adjustment 
and privatization policy packages. 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
The Ideological justifications for Malaysian public enterprise 
have evolved with the changing nature of the state and the 
dominant Interest groups. Before the fifties, public enterprise 
- In the form of government departments and agencies as 
well as statutory bodies - was largely limited to infrastructure 
and utilities provision. As the counter-insurgency efforts against 
the communist-led guerrilla war of 'national liberation' shifted 
from primarily repressive, military methods to 'winning hearts 
and minds', especially among the Malay peasantry; public 
enterprises with redistributional objectives were set up in the 
early .and mid-fifties, e.g. AIDA, the Rural Industrial 
Development Authority, the rubber replanting fund board and 
FELDA, the Federal Land Development Authority (see Stubbs, 
1989; Harper, 1991 ). 
After independence, from the late fifties, other public 
enterprises were set up to promote new economic activities, 
especially Import-substituting manufacturing, e.g. Malayan 
Industrial Development Finance (MIDF), Malayan Industrial 
Estates Limited (MIEL), and tho Federal Industrial 
Devotopmont Authority (FIDA), a w II s th v rlou st to 
economic dovelopmont corporations (SEDCs). Moro publlc 
entorprlsos to promote rural and agricultural dovolopmont as 
woll as regional dovolopmont outhorltlos woro s t up. Also, 
more public enterprises with an othnlo redistributive agenda 
wero sot up from tho mtd-slxtlo as polltlc I pro uro for thnlc 
redistribution In favour of tho M I ys mount d, o. . MARA, 
Bank Bumlputera, PEANAS. 










picked up In the seventies as redistributive efforts were 
sanctloned by the New Economic Policy. Furthermore, windfall 
oil revenues increased from the mid-seventies into the next 
decade, enabling the government to meet the Volcker-induced 
economic recession at the tum of the seventies with increased 
public spending. This momentum, often simplisticly only 
associated with the NEP, came to an abrupt halt with the 
austerity campaign announced soon after the April 1982 
general election. However, Mahathir's personal commitment 
to state promotion of heavy Industries sustained the continued 
growth of certain public enterprises until the mid-eighties, when 
the worsening flscal and debt crises forced the government 
to respond with pollcy changes. Thus, fiscal pressures, 
combined with Mahathir's longstanding personal preference for 
private enterprise (see Mahathlr 1976), precipitated the 'great 
reversal' of the mid-eighties. 
INERTIA 
It has also been argued that public sectors as a whole 
cannot be reformed without undermining their 'distributional 
logic' since the retention of assets under public ownership is 
a political, rather than an economic decision, although 
individual enterprises can be made more economically viable. 
This argument ignores the considerable - and varied - 
welfare economic arguments for public ownership, e.g. of 
natural monopolies, by homogenising them and by defining all 
distributional considerations as normative, and hence political, 
rather than economic. It also assumes that the condition of 
the public sector at any point in time is the logical outcome or 
consequence of state policy or intervention, which in turn 
simply reflects the unchanging distributional goals or objectives 
of the policy intervention. Such a view derives from ·the 
comparative statics implicit in the underlying neoclassical 
economic theory assumed, which has very little relationship 
to the complex dialectical dynamics as well as institutional 
lnenla of political economy in history. Such a static perspective 
cannot even account for the constantly changing character of 










those which would facilitate or even encourage greater overall 
efficiency. 
Undoubtedly, many public sector reforms most Involve 
changes at the enterprise level, I.e. the Internalization and 
implementation of broad policy changes, but· the very 
commonalities shared by many public enterprises suggest that 
broad policy recommendations may be appropriate for the 
rele.vant enterprises. And If economic theory does not develop 
to accommodate such perpectlves so crucial for relevant 
economic analysis, It will necessarily have to be transcended 
by and give way to meta-economic theory. 
ln·Malaysla, for example, public enterprises have been set 
up for a variety of different reasons Including market failures 
(e.g. for 'natural monopolies', or due to the long gestation 
periods required for certain types of Investments), collective 
action problems (e.g. for scale economies in production and 
marketing, Infrastructure provision, export promotion), promo- 
tion of particular sectoral or sub-sectoral activity (manufac- 
turing, agriculture, tourism, etc.), ethnic redistribution (e.g. of 
wealth, employment), and spatial redistribution (including 
regional or local development and agglomeration economies). 
While reforms for the public sector as a whole may be limited, 
there are nonetheless some reforms relevant for the entire 
sector, just as there are reforms only relevant for particular 
enterprises. There are also other reforms which) though not 
relevant for the public sector as a whole, may be relevant for 
enterprises sharing particular characteristics, which may be 
described as Intermediate-level or meso-economlc reforms. 
Rational cholco theory - which omphaslzes revenue 
maximization, distributional coalitions and ront-seoklng - 
predicts regime- onoratod ch n o of an Iner mont I, y l rn- 
sustaln Ing type, tendln towards stnblllty within existing 
arrangements. Howovor, ratlonal cholc thoory sooms to bo 
a poorer prodlotor of subsoquont, do por and wld r pollcy 
reforms, e.g. those Initiated In both Salin a' Moxlco and lndla 
under Rao and Manmohan Singh. 
Organized Interest roup sook and In ron , ov ntuully 
acquiring qu st-monopoly st tu throu h collu Ion, which 










Even leaders who come to power with an economic mandate 
fo~ liberalizing reform have found it hard to give up the 
considerable powers Inherited. For patronage and other 
purposes, ruling politicians quickly develop strong interests in 
retaining, if not expanding the public sector. The array of 
interests which have benefitted from the status quo ante may 
therefore seem so formidable and change therefore so unlikely 
until we consider the recent collapse of similar alliances in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
In Malaysia, the Ministry of Public Enterprises was 
established In the seventies to monitor and supervise public 
enterprise development. There are also other Malaysian 
government agencies wJth similar mandates, Including the 
Prime Minister's Department and the Ministry of Finance. 
However, government officials and public enterprise managers 
themselves have an Interest in maximizing resource flows to 
the public enterprises. More generally, bureaucrats - who 
determine the award of contracts and enjoy other discretionary 
powers liable to abuse in regulatory regimes - are In positions 
to materially benefit from the powers they enjoy. Together, 
such elements combine to create a certain expansionary Inertia 
beyond the specific objectives and purposes of particular public 
enterprises. 
Other interests outside the state have also benefltted from 
the growth of state power including much of the private sector, 
many of the intelligentsia and perhaps even a significant 
section of organized labour. In Malaysia, almost all Malay 
business has either been created by the state, or at least with 
crucial state support. Import substituting industries enjoy 
tariffs, tax incentives, supply contracts and various other 
privileges, while ·export~oriented industries, especially resource- 
based industries, benefit from a different set of investment 
incentives including government credit support, production 
subsidies, etc.. The substantial banking margins enjoyed by 
the flnanclaJ sector, much of the most lucrative business and 
many of the business opportunities enjoyed by the domestic 
market-oriented private sector - Including import substitution 
and non-traceablss - are u.ltimately determined by the state. 










resentment in the private sector, most of this Is never public, 
thus reinforcing the public image of widespread acceptance, 
even approval. More importantly, rent-seeking costs may be 
well below the value of state support enjoyed and the actual 
rents captured, I.e. such costs of 'doing business' may well 
be considered worthwhile. 
After the massive repression against militant unions in 
Malaya in 1948, public sector workers were among the first 
who could be unionized under the colonial authorities. Since 
then, with important exceptions, they have generally been 
considered more supportive of the state than their private 
sector counterparts. Especially In the seventies and early 
eighties, workers In the Malaysian public sector grew rapidly 
In number and have widely been ·c,onsldered relatively 
privileged, enjoying remuneration levels and working conditions 
generally better than their private sector counterparts of 
comparable productivity, ability and experience. The public 
sector job and wage freezes since then and clear trends 
towards increased labour flexibility ( e.g~ see Standing 1991, 
Siti Rohani 1993) have significantly reversed earlier trends. 
However, from the mld-elqhtles.Jt appears that while public 
service employees continue to remain loyal to the government 
of the day, unions representing statutory bodies have been 
more independently minded. The government-endorsed 
Malaysian Labour Organization (MLO) was initiated by the 
relatively privileged National Union of Bank Employees 
(NUSE), while Its president Is also head of the Congress of 
Unions of Employees of Public and Civil Services (CUEPACS). 
Meanwhile, the CUEPACS secretary general Is bidding to also 
become secretary general of the Malaysian Trades Union 
Congress (MTUC) against a moro lndopondont and rotorrn- 
m lndod ooalltlon lod by unions of mployoos from 
manufacturing and tho statutory bodies. 
like tho rest of Malayslan socloty, tho lntolllgontsla Is 
ethnically segmented, with attltudos towards tho roto of tho 
state tending to follow· athnlo loyaltlos. lncreasln Malay 
domln tlon of tho unlvdrslllos, tho modi , and othor spheres 
of publlo llfe has also lnvolvod somo appropriation of provlously 










and hostility to the private sector. And while an Important 
stream of this discourse has been critical of the state, much 
of it has accepted statlst assumptions, focussing Instead on 
how the state might better intervene. 
CHANGE 
Through revolutions, coups and elections, regime changes 
may occur, through which established beneficiaries can be 
displaced by new Interests, who may then use state resources 
very differently. Alternatlvely, existing policy may be 
problematic enough to precipitate economic and political 
crises, requiring policy reform to retain legitimacy and power. 
Also external powers, such as powerful and Influential foreign 
regimes or multilateral economic agencies, may be able to 
exercise sufficient leverage over a regime In order to bring 
about radical policy reform. 
wt}ile state institutions may not be mere Instruments of 
class interests, autonomy does not guarantee that they are 
ahistorically 'rational' maximizers regardless of Institutional 
context Instead, institutional memory and social context may 
recommend options which are deemed more appropriate and 
acceptable. 
Earlier statist strategies were generally not Imposed from 
outside, though in many Instances, they were Inspired by 
diverse foreign ideas and experiences including Friedrich List, 
the Meiji Restoration, the Soviet experience, Keyneslanism, 
Roosevelt's New Deal, European social democracy, 'struc- 
turalist' development economics and the early planning and 
Import-substitution experiments, especially by intermediate 
regimes. Statlst strategies have not simply been the obvious 
logical outcome of dominant post-colonial class interests and 
have had a certain populist and inclusionist appeal, whereas 
economic llberalization appeals to a narrower, arguably 
excluslonlst social spectrum. In Malaysia, these different 
constftutlences have critical ethnic dimensions, which makes 
the dramatic reversal of the mid-eighties all the more 
remarkable, and the cautious and protracted pace of public 










Economic crisis changes the nature of Interests resisting 
reform and allows for strategic breaks. While It Is Machia- 
vellian to suggest that the mid-eighties' recession was 
deliberately exacerbated to create conditions more conducive 
to reform, it is generally agreed that the unprecedentedly 
severe {for Malaysia) economic conditions then generated an 
atmosphere amenable to, and even desirous of radical policy 
change in the hope of quick recovery. Hence, the timing of 
some of the most controversial reforms {e.g. those favouring 
foreign investment) ensured that they met minimal resistance. 
There is little disagreement, however, that the recent reforms 
and boom have consolidated support for the Mahathlr 
administration, especially among the previously alienated 
predominantly Chinese business community, relieved by the 
Increased business opportunities as well as the less arbitrary 
and dispersed rent payments In the more market-embedded 
and hence, market-sanctified transactions which have 
emerged. It might also be suggested that the very market form 
of these reforms {e.g. privatization, involving the sale of public 
assets on the stock market) and the limited political resistance 
to them thus far render them far less susceptible to reversal 
even if regime change should occur. 
While economic liberalization in Malaysia was accelerated 
by the mid-eighties' economic crisis, in the longer term, it has 
reduced government spending increases, slowed down the 
growth of government borrowings, stabilized the foreign debt, 
deployed more public resources to support private enterprise, 
encouraged private enterprise, Including privatization, and 
sought to encourage greater public-private s ctor collaboration. 
The Mahathlr-Dalm economic llberallzatlon strategy has 
undoubtedly brought about many pollcy chan os favoured by 
prlvato caplt I, lncludlng: 
• roductlon of publlo, ospoclally dov lopmont oxpondlture; 
• a more streamllnod govornmont buroauor oy, moro 
respon lvo to lnvostmont and growth promotion; 
• rostr Int of non-fin ncl I publlo ont rprl (NFP ) x- 
panslon: 










• a depreciated rlngglt for export promotion; 
new investment incentives, especially with the Promotion 
of Investments Act, 1986; 
raising of Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) exemption 
levels; 
reduced real wage costs, Increased unemployment (In the 
mid-eighties), greater labour flexibility and the availability 
of cheap migrant labour; 
less emphasis on ethnic redlstributional considerations, 
especially after Mahathlr's announcement - during the 
mid-1980s recession - that NEP requirements had been 
suspended; 
bureaucratic deregulation; 
privatization of some government enterprises and public 
projects; 








But there remains a widespread perception that recent 
government policy changes tend to favour Malay and foreign, 
rather than domestic non-Malay investors. Although there Is 
little official evidence of such a preference for foreigners in 
terms of explicit government policies and regulations, this view 
is widespread, not only among Chinese businessmen, but also 
among many Malay officials. This is reinforced by a common 
view that long-term Malay interests are better served by 
encouraging foreign, rather than domestic Chinese investment. 
Also, the reforms thus far have done far less for market 
and price liberalization as well as other kinds of public 
enterprise reform. The transition from rapid public sector 
expansion during the seventies and early eighties to 
privatization - during the last phase of public enterprise 
growth for heavy industrialization - was abrupt and not 
preceded by a phase of failed public enterprise reform, as in 
some other countries. 
As the reforms In Malaysia were staggered over a number 
of years during the mid-eighties, it is difficult and potentially 
misleading to anribute causation between the reforms and 
macroeconomic performance. Supporters of the reforms point 









their success. Critics, however, emphasize that the 
deflationary reforms exacerbated the 1985-6 recession, while 
the subsequent boom has primarily been due to massive 
Increases in foreign Investment from East Asia In most of 
Southeast Asia and China In the restructuring wake of the 1985 
appreciation of the yen and other currencies of the East Asian 
newly Industrializing countries. Some reform supporters would 
concede the recessionary consequences of public sector 
contraction, emphasizing these as an unavoidable cost and 
necessity for the broader restructuring which has taken 
place. 
The voluntarlst argument about economic llberallzatlon 
claims that social and economic structures have retarded and 
may even obstruct change, but have certainly not determined 
the course of change, which has been set by heads of 
governments supported by politically protected 'reform teams'. 
This argument would find some support in Malaysia, where 
economic liberalization, especially since the mid-eighties, can 
hardly be described as a logical or obvious outcome of the 
preceding growth of state intervention and the public sector 
under Mahathir's predecessors in the seventies and under 
Mahathir himself in the early eighties (though only mainly to 
promote several heavy Industries In collaboration with 
predominantly Japanese partners). To be fair, the counter- 
cyclical deficit budgets, to over-ride the global recession at the 
beginning of the eighties, were Inherited by Mahathir, and were 
subsequently abandoned soon after he secured his electoral 
mandate to rule In the Aprll 1982 elections (see Jomo 1990). 
Despite the economic llberallzatlon slnco the mid-eighties, 
economic planning and lmplemontatlon agenclos -;- especially 
In the Prime Minister's Dopartmont (l.o. U10 conomlc Plannln 
Unit and tho lmplomont tlon and Coordination Unit) - remain 
powerful, a sorting thomsolvos more potontly than ever over 
their reducod turf as tho stato m kos soloctlvo conco Ions 
to the private sector. To onsuro contlnuod polltlcal logltlmacy 
- especially amono tho polltlo lly hogarnonlo M lays - and 
to retain polltloal dominance, tho tato contlnuo to bo 
portrayed as tho coordinator and upr m arblt r of oconomlc 










With the benefit of hindsight, several observers have 
pointed out that there has certainly been a certain consistency 
of thought as far as Mahathir's preference for private enterprise 
Is concerned (e.g. see Mahathlr 1976; Khoo 1992). However, 
while Mahathir - and probably, his then Finance Minister 
Oalm - should be credited with the dramatic policy reversal 
of the mid-eighties, It Is very unlikely that the government could 
have so successfully created a supportive constituency for the 
changes among the politically dominant Malay community If 
not for the successful creation - In the preceding period - 
of a Malay rentler-buslness cadre, who were positioned to take 
advantage of the reforms, which were structured In ways to 
ensure that they would derive dlsproportlonately greater benefit 
from them. 
It Is nonetheless testimony to both Mahathlr's commitment 
as well as the strength of his executive powers that he has 
been able to overcome resistance to his refonns, both from 
within the previously very Influential and powerful bureaucracy 
and also from within his ruling party, UMNO. The availability 
of resource and other rents controlled by the state as well as 
his own enhanced executive powers have enabled him to 
reduce such resistance to some of his reform efforts and 
hence, inevitably, to undermine the entitlements or rent claims 
of 1he hegemonic boc of cflStrib..rtional ooalitions, Onterest grou~) 
that enabled him to come to and remain In power (Mehmet 
1986). 
RESISTANCE 
The task has been made easier because resistance to 
reform has been surprisingly weak since beneficiaries and 
advocates of the policies cannot or will not put up effective, 
coordinated and coherent resistance. As with other situations 
encouraging free-riders, rather than directly oppose change 
and bear the likely considerable costs of doing so, those 
adversely affected have generally tried to protect and preserve 
their own privileges while hoping for others to bear the costs 
of opposing change. It has also been suggested that 










itself. During the Initial period of mlld system-maintaining 
reform, beneficiaries tend to deny the threat of change, at least 
as long as they retain access to their privileges and do not 
feel that they have lost control of the reform process itself. But 
as the reform process deepens, the ruling coalition fragments 
unevenly at different moments for apparently different reasons, 
thus pre-empting the coalescing of coherent, consistent and 
coordinated resistance until It is too late. Resistance, if and 
when it does materialize, may not necessarily be due to rear 
guard actions or sabotage by statist conservatives or others 
adversely affected by the reforms, but may also be the 
consequence of contraolctlons of the economic liberalization 
policies or the reform process Itself. 
· Certainly then, vested Interests have thus far been 
relatively Ineffective In defending their entitlements and In 
resisting reform because they view It as a collective misfortune 
and hope that others will bear its costs as well as ensure 
collective survival while they Individually negotiate new deals 
with the government leadership, as they or their predecessors 
had negotiated their entitlements in the first place. Since 
entitlements were originally granted and not won in most 
Instances, they did not develop the organizational strength and 
resilience as well as experience of struggle and cooperation 
to better defend their own interests. 
In so far as entitrements for the bureaucracy were largely 
granted by government leaders in need of a cadre to 
conceptualise and Implement policy Interventions and manage 
the expanding public sector, the limitations of bureaucratic 
resistance can be accounted for. In many cases, Incumbent 
bureaucrats have not experienced a diminution of their formal 
positions, powers and entitlements, but only of their Informal, 
albeit real status and lncomos dorlvod from th dlscr llonory 
and other powers thoy onco enjoyed more of In a much more 
bureaucratlcally rogul tod onvlronmont with less executive 
hegemony. Hence, thoy aro hardly In a po ltlon to publicly 
complain or expllcltly or anlze resistance on such bases. 
Succes ful polltlol n , o poolally from tho domln nt 
UMNO, p rtlcularly tho o f vourod by tho oxooullvo, h vo 










various percuniary benefits, usually linked to appointments to 
and control of ministries, state agencies and public 
enterprises. Economic liberalization has therefore probably 
most adversely affected the lower levels of politically- 
connected Malay businessmen - Influential within UMNO 
primarily at branch level and within Malay business lobbies, 
and dependent on dispensations from the executive - who 
have been displaced in favour of a generally younger, more 
professionally trained and competent managerial cadre 
answering only to the apex of the political executive and their 
select group of politically Influential, but also somewhat 
capable and often creative rentler businessmen. Whllo both 
groups are rentiers, the ascendant group are generally more 
competent and 'can deliver', whereas even this was often In 
doubt with many of the former. 
Continued regulation and other constraints to competition 
have ensured the continued existence of political rents, though 
it is difficult to say whether the magnitude of the rents has 
changed. However, most observers would agree that there 
is less wastage and probably greater efficiency at the 
enterprise level due to greater enterprise autonomy and 
accountability in recent years. It appears, though, that the 
concentration of executive powers may have been reflected 
by a concentration of rents, with less dispersal and arbitra- 
riness in the rent appropriation process. In the hands of a 
more competent managerial cadre, these surplus rents - I.e. 
after paying the costs of either ensuring political Incumbency 
and influence, or of trying to gain greater influence to secure 
an undiminished and, if possible, a greater share of the 
expanding pie - are more concentrated, and hence more 
likely to be more effectively deployed to accumulate further 
rents, thus contributing to more efficient and less wasteful rent 
accumulation. 
Elsewhere in the Third World, the private sector has often 
been depicted as weak, prone to speculation and profiteering 
and likely to sell out national interests for personal profit, while 
state Intervention has been deemed necessary to protect the 
public Interests, especially the poor, from private greed, and 










capitalized private Interests could not until an enlightened, 
nationalist and far-sighted entrepreneurial community emerged. 
The only element of this justification frequently heard in 
Malaysia - though of little relevance in terms of the actual 
nature of state interventions and public sector expansion - 
Invokes the imagery of the poor Malay (peasant) exploited by 
the rich Chinese (middleman). Instead, the Malaysian private 
sector is portrayed as too strong and oblivious of distributional 
concerns. More rarely, It is portrayed as speculative and short- 
sighted, but this has almost never been invoked as part of the 
official rationale for public enterprise. Nor has the Issue of 
foreign collaboration or subordination been emphasized, given 
the government's own proclivity to encourage or even do the 
same. The Malaysian authorities have also never claimed that 
public enterprise expansion was remotely connected to any 
state socialist initiative. The expansion of public enterprises 
was always portrayed as the result of state capitalist initiatives 
for ethnic - rather than class - redistribution purposes. 
Nevertheless, however, there has been some shift in rhetorical 
emphasis about public sector priorities, from redistribution - 
now assumed to be the over-riding objective of state 
intervention anyway - to profitability, though not cost- 
effectiveness. 
For a long time, the private sector in Malaysia has been 
portrayed as Chinese-dominated. In fact, however, the 
commanding heights of the modern corporate sector were 
foreign, especially British dominated, until the early seventies. 
The growth of the public sector on behalf of the Malay 
community during the seventies and the concerted Chinese 
response to the NEP in the form of greater corporatlzatlon (sso 
Gomez, 1991) wrested ownership and control of much of 
International trade, tin mlnln and tho pl nt lion sector aw y 
from forelgnors, ospoclally from tho mlc-s vontlos until tho 
early elghtlos. Hence, whllo most now, especially export- 
orlontsd manufacturing and domo tlcally-orlontod modorn 
services are controlled by a varloty of forolgn lnvostors, tho 
extent of their power Is gros ly undorstatod by oHlclal osum too 
of corporate h ro ownor hip. Whllo much of tho b I nco of 










economy (especially finance) appear to be in Malay - 
including state - hands, most of the rest of the modern 
corporate sector Is probably in Chinese Malaysian hands 
despite claims to the contrary (see Fong 1989). 
Economic liberalization - including greater Incentives and 
other concessions to private, especially foreign Investment as 
well as privatization - Is likely to further consolidate this ethnic 
segmentation of the economy. Despite their varied origins and 
objectives, the primary justification for state intervention and 
the public sector since the seventies has been the protection 
and advancement of Malay economic Interests by the Malay- 
domlnated state. Conversely, the argument against qrsater 
private sector hegemony through economic llberallzatlon has 
been ethnic, usually emphasizing the ubiquitous Chinese 
Malaysian presence, rather than continued foreign domination 
of the economy, except rather recently, when the Influx of new 
investments from East Asia has focussed attention on the 
Chinese ethnic affinities of both foreign and Malaysian 
investors. 
It has also been suggested that the formation of a coherent 
public sector managerial elite, the development of dependent 
privileged labour organizations as well as enterprise longevity 
and tradition are likely to result in stronger defence of the public 
sector and greater as well as more broad-based resistance to 
reform. In Malaysia, however, although the public sector 
managerial elite is predominantly Malay, the structuring of the 
privatization programme to favour Malays, has probably 
reduced such resistance very considerably. While public 
sector trade unions and the Congress of Unions of Employees 
of the Public and Civil Services (CUEPACS) have long been 
patronized by the government.. labour resistance to privatization 
has been minimized by ensuring that the predominantly Malay, 
directly employed workers affected by privatization are better 
off In the short and medium term under the terms of 
corporatlzatlon and privatization. Since corporatization and 
privatization thus far have mainly involved the profitable public 
ut lity monopolies, the employers concerned have been able 
to afford these conditions, especially with the Increases In user 










privatization. Rather surprisingly, despite their long existence, 
especially compared to other Malaysian public enterprises, 
. longevity does not seem to have significantly enhanced 
resistance to privatization. 
Surprisingly, economic liberalization In Malaysia does not 
seem to have been considerably slowed down by the parallel 
political crisis which reached Its height during 1986-88. 
Elsewhere, during the first phase(s) of economic liberalization 
initiated domestically, the regime tends to seek to achieve 
change without upsetting the ruling coalition and Its allies. 
Usually, only after being either emboldened by success or 
compelled by failure In this first phase, the executive moves 
on to try to reshape Its political and hence social base, even 
reaching out to elements outside the social pact underlying the 
ruling coalition, e.g. by appealing to consumers (e.g. with antl- 
lnflationary promises), instead of labour. Sustained policy 
reform therefore depends on breaks and discontinuities. 
Economic crisis - possibly, but not necessarily due to flawed 
economic policies and their consequences - may provide 
such a break as self-interested, incumbent regimes are thus 
forced to try to change the (explicit or implicit) coalitional basis 
of their power. 
Yet, if the leadership becomes alarmed by the nature or 
pace of change, or its consequences, it may still abandon the 
entire process. On the other hand, successful reform may well 
precipitate further reform with its own momentum. In Malaysia, 
however, the reform process has been so closely Identified 
with Prime Minister Mahathlr and former (1984-91) Finance 
Minister Dalm that the future of the reform process after 
Mahathlr Is In grave doubt. While some of the reforms are 
virtually Irreversible (e.g. the sale of publlo a sot on the stock 
exchange) and others aro unllkoly to b rovor od by his 
successor (e. . tho end of tho oft budgot constraints for public 
enterprises In gonoral), all his llkoly uccossors on tho horizon 
seem committed to dlfteront populist agondas Involving varying 
statlst reforms. Whllo It ml ht bo sug ostod that all aspirants 
to governmont loodor hip In tho M I y I n cont xt aro obll d 
to espouse populist rhotorlo, o pocl lly In light of M I ,y pollUcal 










believe - judging from their political careers - that their 
populist positions, albeit varied, are nonetheless sincerely held. 
CORPORATISM AND NATIONALISM 
Despite - or rather, precisely because of - Malaysia's 
ethnic, religious, cultural, regional and other differences, as well 
as the nature of Malaysia's decolonization and formation, it has 
been argued that a progressive nationalist - as opposed to 
ethno-populist as well as neo-colonial globalist - project 
(Jomo 1989) Is urgently required In Malaysia. However, for 
the nationalist agenda to be viable In this day and age, It will 
need to be accompanied by a broadly lncluslonlst corporatist 
project. Thus far, however, It has been 'ethno-popullsm' - 
promoted by the ethnically based dominant parties of the ruling 
coalition - which has thrived on ethnic corporatism, which Is 
inimical to and under-mines national corporatism. 
A feeble attempt at tripartlsm - Involving government, 
employers and organized labour - In the first half of the 
seventies died with Malaysia's supposedly Fabian-Influenced 
second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein. More 
recently, since the early eighties, Mahathlr has been 
associated with two different variants of corporatism. On the 
one hand, he has promoted company-level corporatism, 
particularly by encouraging in-house or company unions. More 
importantly, on the other hand, he has been associated with 
the 'Malaysia Incorporated' concept, popularly understood as 
an attempt to improve government-business relations, I.e. 
between the public and private sectors. But neither Initiative 
can be regarded as a truly national corporatist project seeking 
to Involve major segments of the population. 
Mahathlr's 'Malaysia Incorporated' concept can be 
Interpreted to imply recognition that Japanese, and even NIC 
economic success, has been due to successful and effective 
•market-augmenting" state intervention and public sector 
expansion, rather than the apparently "market-negating" 
policies said to characterize Malaysian government policy, or 
the naive submission to market forces, advocated by free 










commonly understood Interpretation In Malaysia. Instead, 
espousal of the concept Implies recognition of existing 
problems between the Malay-dominated government and the 
predominantly Chinese domestic private sector, exacerbated 
by the NEP and the desire to urgently overcome them In the 
interest of greater economic growth and dynamism. 
Despite official espousal of the 'Malaysia Incorporated' 
slogan, the emphasis given to selected facets of Japanese 
corporate culture, particularly industrial relations, has been 
biased, to say the least. Unlike Japanese employees, 
Malaysian workers In the private sector - including Japanese 
controlled firms - have never been assured of job security, 
let alone life-long· employment. While job remuneration tends 
to reward seniority, wage levels, Increments and other 
percunlary benefits have rarely been enough to secure loyalty 
from most workers. Various amendments to the labour laws 
over the years have mainly been at the expense of workers. 
To this day, there is no minimum wage. Workers have little 
opportunity to participate in decision-making, let alone control 
their working lives. Relatively few workers in the modern 
manufacturing and private services sector are unionized, and 
the trend has been towards casualization of work, rather than 
job security, despite generally declining unemployment and 
increasingly tight labour market conditions. With rising 
unemployment through the mid-eighties, real wage levels were 
depressed until the late eighties. Since then, labour shortages 
- especially of skilled workers - have driven wages up, 
though officially sanctioned employment of foreign labour 
continues to serve as a depressant. In such circumstances, 
It Is not surprising that worker loyalty and commitment have 
been difficult to secure. 
Most Chino o Mal y Ion buslnos mon do not von dr am 
of govornmont support for their business actlvltlos, and hence, 
ospouso a 'second bo t' proforonco ror minim I ovornm nt 
Interference, which translatos ldoologlcally Into support for tho 
free market consorvatlvos. Not surprlsln ly In thoso clrcum- 
stancoa, thoro Is llttlo ovldonco, ovon amen tho rol tlv ly moro 
dynamic Chinese ontropronours, of a M I yslan notion llst 










or Japan, with the state playing a crucial role in supporting, 
and sometimes even leading nationalist indus-trialization. Such 
a possibility Is generally considered so far-fetched and 
Inconceivable by most Chinese Malaysian businessmen after 
years of experience In Malaysia, especially under the NEP, that 
they would be quite happy if only the government gets and 
stays out of their way. 
However, It Is precisely such collaboration which is 
necessary If Malaysia Is going to accelerate and consolidate 
late Industrialization under national auspices, i.e. with Its own 
Industrial dynamism, rather than riding on the unreliable backs 
of transnational oorporatlons Investing In the oountry. After all, 
In terms of simple national Income growth criteria, Malaysia 
had already crossed the threshold of US$2,000 per capita In 
1984. Growth performance since 1987 has been even more 
Impressive. However, growth h s long been heavily based on 
the successful export of raw materials, Including some non- 
renewable natural resources, and a limited range of manufac- 
tured items. Domestic Industrial linkages have apparently 
improved since the late eighties mainly due to relatively lower 
production costs in Malaysia. Recent economic and techno- 
logical changes have made it attractive for foreign firms to 
locate more production processes in Malaysia and to source 
more input supplies from local ancillary firms, often on a Just- 
in-time (JIT) basis, to minimize inventory costs and risks. Many 
of these parts suppliers are foreign small and medium 
Industries which have relocated in Malaysia. 
Unlike Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and even Hong Kong, 
Malaysian Industrialization has been heavily dependent on 
foreign capital and technology. And unlike Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore, the state has only played a supportive, 
rather than a leading role in Malaysian industrialization. A great 
deal more needs to be done to develop the sources of 
Industrial dynamism in Malaysia, and this can only be achieved 
throu h collaboration between the state and genuine Malaysian 
Industrial entrepreneurs from the domestic private sector in the 
lntorest or lndustrlallzatlon under genuine national auspices. 
However, corporatism for economic nationalism cannot 










sectors, or more specifically, to resubordlnate bureaucrats to 
the behests of private business. Rather, It has to be more 
broadly populist In conception. Hence, Malaysian economic 
nationalism must be truly corporatist, securing the crucial 
support, participation and commitment of organized labour, 
especially industrial workers. 
To achieve this, the state cannot blatantly side with 
management against labour, as It currently does, ostensibly 
to lower production costs In the Interest .of international 
competitiveness. Rather, It should build on the nascent 
trlpartlsm espoused, albeit weakly, during the Razak era and 
embodied In the Code for Industrial Harmony, e.g. by 
democratizing and strengthening, not weakening, the role of 
the tripartite National Labour Advisory Council (NLAC). In this 
connection, It Is Important to recognize the differences between 
Industrial relations in South Korea and Japan, with the former 
more blatantly repressive ('bloody Taylorlsm'), while the latter 
has been corporatist at the company level, thus ensuring 
competitive advantage at the workplace (Lazonick 1991 ). A 
third alternative for serious consideration is the 'social 
corporatism' of the Scandinavian social democracies and 
Central Europe, especially Germany's 'social market' - 
arguably the most progressive form of Fordism ('mass 
production, mass consumpiton') sustaining the post-war 
'Golden Age'. 
To put it bluntly then, there are two choices. Firstly, to 
rely on continued export-led growth on the basis of repression 
of cheap labour {'bloody Taylorlsm'), or secondly, to develop 
the domestic market as well, by ensuring more egalitarian 
Income and wealth distribution as well s consumption p tterns 
linked to rising productivity, resulting In lmprovod on ral llvln 
standards. Tho de ponlng of tho dom tlo mark t would, for 
example, oncourago consumor oloctronlcs and othor lndustrlos 
orlonted tow rds tho dom euo m rk t. With tho dovolopm nt 
of genulno M laysl n ontropronour hip nd tochnolo lo I 
capacity, Malaysia would contlnuo to lndustrlallze and 
effeotlvoly compoto Int rn lion lly with loo r II nco upon nd 











The Malaysian authorities should not continue to depress 
wage levels by encouraging or allowing the virtually un- 
regulated Inflow of Immigrant labour, job insecurity and 
Increased labour flexibility to undermine the bargaining position 
of workers, especially unskilled and lowly skilled labour. With 
a well-trained, highly productive and adaptable labour force, 
Malaysia can progress more rapidly with its relatively small 
population, boosted by the natural resource abundance we 
have been blessed with. 
Recent renewed interest in the Implementation of the 
'Malaysia Incorporated' concept as part of Mahathlr's Vision 
2020 provides a rare opportunity to re-examine and broaden 
the concept Itself to make It more meaningful, balanced and 
broadly desirable in the pursuit of national unity, rather than 
to try to move the nation forward solely on the basis of 
Improved public-private sector relations. A broader-based 
nationalist economic strategy - Involving labour and the 
peasantry more fully in national development efforts - Is 
clearly necessary. Such participation will only be forthcoming 
if better deals are offered to these two large productive, but 
disadvantaged groups. Tripartism and generally Improved 
conditions for workers, would go a long way in securing labour 
support for a nationalist development strategy. Similarly, a 
comprehensive, progressive agrarian reform would not only 
raise agricultural productivity, but would also Incorporate the 
peasantry more fully and equitably into the national 
development process. Such a nationalist vision of develop- 
ment is not only necessary to achieve continued and 
sustainable progress in the late twentieth century, but would 
also go a long way towards improving ethnic relations, and 
hence, the security and stability of the nation. 
To return to the themes with which we began this 
discussion, a useful analogy may well be the traffic situation. 
As we all know, growth in traffic volume does not, in and of 
Itself, Imply a general improvement in human welfare; some 
would, In fact, argue quite the contrary in certain circum- 
stances. Now Imagine the chaos which would reign if the state 
did not Intervene to provide the institutional framework for traffic 









regulations. As the prisoners' dilemma In game theory teaches 
us, individualistic actions in the market are not always the best 
means for resolving collective action problems. As the 
Malaysian traffic authorities have discovered, appealing to 
society's best interests to promote car pooling does not 
overcome the free-rider problem of those who only want others 
to sacrifice in the community's and their own interests. Also, 
demonstrating the superiority of an optimal situation In 
comparative static terms does not adequately recognize and 
address problems of how to get there, just as It falls to 
recognize the nature of the market as a process. 
There are also philosophlcal and practical problems with 
the market conservatives' utopia and view of humanity. Homo 
sap/ens Is not homo economicus, notwithstanding what many 
economists might like to believe. (In June 1993, The 
Economist reported that academic economists have a greater 
tendency than other academics to believe their own - worst 
- assumptions about human behaviour, and consequently, to 
act more selfishly, greedily and individualistically than others). 
People have various social commitments, family ties, religious 
convlctons, ethnic loyalties, patriotic sentiments, psychological 
needs and moral beliefs, most of which contradict textbook 
assumptions about homo economicus. Some things are not 
supposed to be bought and sold - e.g. votes, love, etc. - 
although the existence of money politics and prostitution may 
be cited as evidence to the contrary. But the very fact that 
these offend our moral sensibilities and proclaimed public 
values suggests that society values things not only for their 
exchange value. Honea, thorn Is a porpotual tonslon betwoon 
the two lncompatiblo prlnclplos of one-porson-one-voto, 
promised by politic I domocracy, qu lily nd ju tic , nd of 
ono-rlngglt-on voto, a .,ug o l d by m rk l pow r nd 
consumer sov rol nty. Fortun toly, hum n socloty, bolstored 
by unlvors I civic - not market - v lu , h r slst d tho 
market's tendency towards sool I Darwinism. Honco, for 
example, most of us bollovo that all chlldr n h vo a rl ht to 
oduc lion and II p opls havo rl ht to m die I o ro 
regardloss of tholr blllty top y. Do rn tlo tot I r locuon of th 










recognize the virtue of the market as an information 
economizer. Conversely, Chakravarthy reminds us that the 
market can be a wonderful servant, but a terrible master.· The 
market needs a place, but also needs to be kept in place. We 
are not mere consumers, but also producers and, most 
importantly, citizens. In other words, to pursue the traffic analogy 
further, the way forward for Malaysia requires a left turn. 
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